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REPORT FROM SERBIA*
Jack G. Day**
INTRODUCTION
THERE ARE SO many creases and wrinkles in Ohio's public sec-
tor collective bargaining law' that one is tempted to tackle them
all. Fortunately for the readers' patience, the Colloquium design
has imposed time and space limitations. I shall, therefore, simply
list seven significant areas that I perceive in the twenty-three sec-
tions of the statute and reserve more intensive discussion for two
particular sections.
The seven general areas, according to my perception, are: (1)
provision and oversight of representation procedures,2 (2) protec-
tion against unfair labor practices,3 (3) oversight of collective bar-
gaining through the administration of impasse procedures,4 (4)
training of employee organization and public employer representa-
tives in collective bargaining,5 (5) provision of a clearinghouse for
collective bargaining data,6 (6) a variety of enforcement processes,7
and (7) ancillary problems involving such questions as rebate provi-
sions and religious exemptions.8
Detailed consideration will be given only to bargaining impasse
procedures9 and concepts involved in so-called voluntary recogni-
tion.'0 Suggestions are made for improving both."
* SERB is an acronym for the State Employment Relations Board.
** The author is Chairman of the Ohio State Employment Relations Board and gives
special recognition to his colleagues on the SERB and associates on the Board staff. Vice
Chairman William P. Sheehan and Member Helen H. Fix, Executive Director Kenneth W.
Barrett, General Counsel Jacqueline F. Davis, Hearing Officer Lea M. Spector-Idinopulos,
and Mediation Bureau Administrator G. Thomas Worley all read this Article and made valu-
able suggestions. If any flaws remain, the author assumes all responsibility for them.
1. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-.23 (Page Supp. 1984) (the Act or statute).
2. Id. §§ 4117.04, .06.
3. Id. §§4117.11-.13.
4. Id. § 4117.14(C)-(D).
5. Id. § 4117.02(H)(4).
6. Id. § 4117.02(H)(6).
7. Id. §§4117.11-.16, .23.
8. Id. § 4117.09(C).
9. See infra notes 12-74 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
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I. BARGAINING IMPASSE PROCEDURES
A. Objectives
The legislative intent of section 4117.14 is fairly obvious. Its
objective is to promote settlements between public sector parties
throughout the collective bargaining process. The State Employ-
ment Relations Board (Board or SERB) has a mandated role in
achieving those objectives.
Once representation issues are resolved, SERB's first assistance
involves appointment of a mediator. This is done when the parties'
bargaining efforts are stalemated or, in any event, at a specific time-
point dictated by the statute. 2 And, when bargaining is either com-
pletely stymied or at a statutorily mandated date, SERB initiates
the selection of factfinders' 3 to move the settlement along to the
point where the only remaining recourse for safety forces is final
and binding arbitration, and for non-safety forces the options of sur-
render, arbitration, or job action.14 SERB's province is that of initi-
ator, monitor, activator and guardian.
B. A Party's Obligations Under Statutory Bargaining
Impasse Procedures
When either party desires a change in an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement, that party is required by the Act to provide
written notice of the proposed change to the other. The notice must
be served not less than sixty days before the expiration date of the
existing agreement. If there is no expiration date, the service must
be not less than sixty days before the proposed effective date of the
changes, modifications, or successor agreement. 5 The party giving
notice must offer to bargain collectively with the other, for the pur-
poses (implicitly) which the notice specifies. 6 It also must notify
SERB of the offer by serving it with a copy of the written notice and
11. See infra notes 75-80 and 109-16 and accompanying text.
12. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
13. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
14. Final and binding arbitration is an option for non-safety forces if management
agrees. But it is the only alternative for safety forces as defined in the Act. Id.
§ 4117.1(D)(1). Safety forces are forbidden to strike and must enter final and binding concili-
ation, i.e., arbitration. Safety force management also has no choice. Settlement awards are
still subject to court review. Id. § 4117.14(H). Once the award is fixed it "constitutes a
binding mandate to the public employer and the exclusive representative to take whatever
actions are necessary to implement the award." Id. § 4117.14(1).
15. Id. § 4117.14(B)(1)(a).
16. Id. § 4117.14(B)(1)(b).
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a copy of any existing collective bargaining agreement.17
Where there is no collective bargaining agreement and the nego-
tiations are the first between the parties, the party desiring bargain-
ing must serve notice upon the Board and the other party, giving
names and addresses and offering to meet for a period of ninety
days to negotiate an agreement.18
After a notice to negotiate, the parties are required to begin bar-
gaining. 9 The parties to an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment must continue their relationship without resort to strike or
lockout for sixty days or until the expiration date of the collective
bargaining agreement, whichever occurs later.20 The same strike
and lockout rules apply for a period of ninety days in the case of a
first contract. 21
Forty-five days before the expiration date of the negotiation pe-
riod or of a current collective bargaining agreement, or earlier if an
impasse exists,22 the Board must appoint a mediator to assist the
parties in collective bargaining. This must be done or offered
whether or not the parties or either party requests or wants
mediation.
The appointment of a mediator also may activate a Board re-
sponsibility to pay the mediator. At least, the statute does not indi-
cate the contrary. So far, SERB has relied upon the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service to supply mediators on request.
These mediators have involved no expense to the Board, but (and
no perjorative implication is intended) the Board has no power to
compel impasse reporting from federal conciliators. This makes it
difficult to fulfill the statutory command that factfinders be ap-
pointed if the mediator reports an impasse earlier than thirty-one
days before expiration. 3 In time, the Board may have to employ
17. Id. § 4117.14(B)(1)(c).
18. Id. § 4117.14(B)(2).
19. Id. § 4117.14(B)(4).
20. Id. § 4117.14(B)(3); cf. id. § 4117.18(C) (public employees prohibited from strildng
during § 4117.14 settlement proceedings).
21. Id. § 4117.14(B)(3). See also id. § 4117.14(B)(2) (If the settlement procedures
specified in divisions (B), (C), and (D) of this section govern the parties, where those proce-
dures refer to the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, it means the expiration of
the sixty-day period to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement referred to in this subdivi-
sion, or in the case of initial negotiations, it means the ninety-day period referred to in this
subdivision.")
22. The Act is silent as to who must issue any earlier impasse notice. Presumably notice
from the parties, perhaps from either of them, triggers SERB's responsibility to appoint a
mediator even before the 45th day. See id. § 4117.14(C)(2).
23. Id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
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full-time staff mediators.
Whether impasse advice is received or not and whether the par-
ties request factfinding or not, the Board is required to appoint a
factfinding panel of not more than three members "not later than 31
days prior to the expiration date of the agreement." 2 Moreover,
whether impasse advice or the thirty-one-day limit is the trigger, the
factfinding appointment must occur "within one day."2 The first
appointment effort must come from the parties in accordance with
rules established by the Board. The selection is made from a list of
qualified persons the Board is required to maintain. If the parties
are unable to arrive at a selection, SERB acts for them and may
select one or more, but not more than three, factfinders.26 This
means that the Board necessarily must monitor the collective bar-
gaining procedures closely, anticipate the necessity for factfinding,
and begin the selection process in advance of the thirty-one days;
otherwise, the "appoint within one day" obligation cannot be
satisfied.
The monitoring obligation is a double-barrelled one. Whenever
a notice of negotiation is filed with the Board, it activates the re-
sponsibility to note when the mediator's appointment must be
made, absent an earlier notice of impasse. The notice also starts the
clock on the obligation to make sure that if no earlier impasse notifi-
cation is received from the mediator, the factfinding process is insti-
tuted within the thirty-one-day limitation. The staggering
dimension of this duty can be approximated by considering the
number of possible bargaining units in Ohio's public sector--each
with a negotiation obligation when the unit has been recognized or
certified.
Ohio has eighty-eight counties, each with ten or more potential
24. Id. § 4117.14(C)(2) provides that SERB "shall" intervene and investigate "fifty days
before the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement" at the request of either
party to determine whether the parties have engaged in collective bargaining. The determina-
tion process and its effect are not delineated. Moreover, the investigation intervention must
begin and apparently conclude within five days. Under the same clause, a mediator must be
appointed not less than 45 days before "the expiration date of the collective bargaining agree-
ment." Id. It seems unlikely that the legislature intended that both the Board and its ap-
pointee be operating at the same time. Because of the application of other aspects of the
impasse procedure, this provision is for all practical purposes inoperative. The unfair labor
practices procedures, however, are available if either party refuses to bargain. See id.
§ 4117.11(A)(5) and (B)(3) (defining an unfair labor practice as refusal to bargain
collectively).
25. See id. § 4117.14(C)(3).
26. See id; OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4117-9-01(A), 4117-9-05(D) (1984) (describing
qualified persons list and panel selection).
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bargaining units stemming from the county offices.27 There are lit-
erally hundreds of townships and more than 200 cities of 5,000 or
more population.28 In each city it is likely that there are from two
to twenty appropriate bargaining units. In addition, there are more
than 600 public school districts29 plus vocational education institu-
tions, and each of them has a potential for one or more bargaining
units.
One may conclude that there may be several hundred, conceiva-
bly several thousand, negotiation sessions subject to Board monitor-
ing at any one time. Such predictions, of course, depend upon the
terms of the statute as it is now written.
Still another aspect of the factfinding process is a fiscal one. In
the event that factfinding does indeed take place, the parties each
incur an obligation for one-quarter of the expense, and the state (the
Board) incurs an obligation for one-half.30 This is no small financial
item when one considers the number of factfinding processes that
may be going on at the same time. It is possible that as many as
three persons may be involved in each at $300 per day per person.31
In addition to the duties outlined so far, the processes estab-
lished by the Act give the Board broad authority to continue media-
tion and to order the parties to engage in collective bargaining until
the expiration date of the contract. Indeed, the authorizing clauses
of the statute seem to permit mediation at any time.32 Given the
extensive duties imposed by the monitoring process, however, very
little staff time will be available for mediation.
This, however, does not end the Board's responsibility in the
factfinding process. The Act also imposes the obligation to pre-
scribe guidelines for the factfinding panel to "follow in making find-
ings.'" 33 The Act itself lists a series of factors which the factfinding
panel is to take into account in coming to its decision.34 SERB has
responded to the statutory imperatives with an elaborate rule to
27. SECRETARY OF STATE, OHIO POPULAION REPORT 8-122 (1980).
28. Id. at 124-50. See 01o REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(B) (Page Supp. 1984) for the
Act's definition of public employer.
29. Telephone Interview with Daniel Johnson, Legal Counsel to Ohio Department of
Education (Oct. 15, 1985).
30. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(5) (Page Supp. 1984).
31. OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-01(C) (1984).
32. "The board may continue mediation, order the parties to engage in collective bar-gaining until the expiration date of the agreement, or both." OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.14(C)(3)(b) (Page Supp. 1984). Both factflnders and conciliators may attempt media-
tion "at any time" during their respective tenures. Id. § 4117.14(C)(4)(f) and (G)(1).
33. Id. § 4117.14(C)(4)(a).34. Id. § 4117.14(G3)(7)(a)-(f).
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govern the factfinding process, including the use of a list of qualified
factfinders.35
The statute also mandates that SERB issue subpoenas upon re-
quest by the factfinding panel for the purpose of hearings.36 Cir-
cumstances may make compulsory process appropriate, but if there
is a contest over propriety, the Board must resolve that issue. Pre-
sumably, the procedure would be in the nature of a motion to
quash.
Once the factfinding panel has been appointed, it must act by a
majority vote and transmit its findings of fact and recommendations
for the disposition of the unresolved issues to the parties and the
Board "no later than fourteen days after the appointment. . . un-
less the parties mutually agree to an extension. ' '37
Not later than seven days after the findings and recommenda-
tions are sent, the parties must vote upon acceptance of the findings
of fact and recommendations and certify the results.38 Unless
turned down by a three-fifths vote of the total membership of either
party, the recommendations are deemed, by operation of law,
"agreed upon as the final resolution of the issues submitted. ' 39 A
collective bargaining agreement must be executed including the rec-
ommendations unless the parties mutually agree to modify them.4
The Board may have to intervene, although there is no specific stat-
utory provision, to determine whether in fact there has been a legiti-
35. Id. § 4117.02(H)(1); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-05(A)-(O) (1984).
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(4)(c) (Page Supp. 1984).
37. Id. § 4117.14(C)(5).
38. Id. § 4117.14(C)(6); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-05(K)-(M).
39. Id.
40. Id. See In re Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 21 and City of Lima, No. -
(Ohio SERB Jan. 25, 1985). Neither party timely certified the results. The Board deemed the
results certified and ordered that they be incorporated in an executed collective bargaining
contract unless modified by mutual agreement. The parties had complied with neither the
statute nor the rule, and the Board said:
Each party is required to vote on the report within seven days of issuance ....
[§ 4117.14(C)(6)] Under Rule 4117-9-05 of the Administrative Code, the parties
must certify the results of the vote within 24 hours of the tally of the votes.
"Although the 24-hour reporting requirement is directory for days within the 7-day
voting period, the 24-hour requirement is mandatory for a proper rejection if the
tally of votes is not certified to the Board within 24 hours of the end of the 7-day
period.
Id.
In a later case the Board adopted a different view of enforcement. That case held that
failure to comply with the statutory mandate to place approved factfinding results in an exe-
cuted collective bargaining agreement should be redressed through unfair labor practice
charge procedures. In re Sidney Fire Fighters, IAFF Local No. 912 and City of Sidney 2
OHIo PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL. PREss) 2510 (Ohio SERB Apr. 23, 1985).
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mate repudiation of the findings and recommendations by either
party.
Should either party reject the fact-finding recommendations,
SERB is required to publicize them.a ' If the parties are unable to
come to an agreement within seven days after publication, or the
collective bargaining agreement (if one exists) has expired, safety
employees are relegated to a conciliation (arbitration) procedure.42
The Act refers repeatedly to a single conciliator43 but takes account
of the possibility of a panel.'
The Board participates in conciliator selection by providing a
list of five qualified persons.45 Should the parties be unable to
achieve a selection by alternate striking of names, the Board makes
the appointment.'
A strike may be legal for non-safety forces if the publication of
the factfinding results has not produced an agreement within seven
days or if any existing agreement has expired.47 However, a strike
must be preceded by a ten-day prior written notice of intent served
on the public employer and the Board.48 Standards for an adequate
legal notice require that it designate a specific time and date.49
Serious notice-related issues not yet determined by Board deci-
sion or statute include what is to be done if a strike does not take
place on the time and date specified. It is ridiculous to assume that
the legislature intended to compel a strike at the assigned date and
time. Indeed, it is clear that quite the opposite was intended. This
is manifest from the legislative regulation of the economic leverage
represented by lockouts and strikes."0 But is agreement the only
method for extending the notice, or is there a reasonable period af-
ter a specific notice within which a strike is still valid absent agree-
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(6) (Page Supp. 1984).
42. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
43. See ag., id. and id. § 4117.14(G).
44. Id. § 4117.14(G)(9).
45. Id. § 4117.14(D)(1).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 4117.11(B)(8). See South Euclid-Lyndhurst Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio Ass'n of
Pub. School Employees Chapter 110, 1 Omo PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAs. REL. PREss)
1171 (Ohio SERB Sept. 20, 1984).
50. A presumption that the legislature did not intend that a strike must occur because
notice has been given is partially reinforced by the statutory provision that "once the notice is
given, the parties may extend it by the written agreement of both." Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.11(B)(8) (Page Supp. 1984). If the extension is treated as a savings clause and consid-
ered in conjunction with the logic of the statute's general policy against strike action, the
presumption seems a virtual certainty.
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ment? Or, must (or may) a new unilateral notice be given with a
new specific time and date?
Lockouts are totally precluded by the Act,5 1 and limitations are
placed upon the right to strike. 2 Moreover, the requirement that
any legal job action must be preceded by notice with some specific
details5 3 demonstrates that the legislature meant to eliminate hit
and run tactics in labor controversies involving public employees.
The logic of this is supported by consideration of the health and
welfare services affected if public sector strikes are not accompanied
by adequate notice. Obviously, job actions such as strikes by public
hospital employees or school employees which may affect the health
of patients and safety of children cannot be left to the tactical ca-
price of a contending party.
C. Mutually Agreed Dispute Settlement Procedure
The parties may agree on an alternative dispute settlement pro-
cess (mutually agreed dispute resolution or MAD) to supersede the
statutory impasse procedure. The Act indicates at one point that
this agreement must occur not less than forty-five days before the
expiration date of the time period set in motion by the notice to
negotiate.54 Another section of the statute permits the parties to
submit the issues in dispute to any mutually "agreed-upon dispute
settlement" process "at any time."55 SERB rules regulate the
method. 6
An important question is whether time-point intervention by
SERB is ever required in the event a superseding impasse procedure
exists. And, if so, under what circumstances? What is the effect if
the parties make Board intervention a part of their procedure?
SERB has been proceeding as though supersession terminated the
Board's intervention responsibility. There has been no occasion to
face the question of the Board's duty if the parties' MAD attempts
to impose Board intervention.
Permissive supersession is a prolific source of controversy fre-
quently stemming from settlement procedures in contracts executed
51. Id. § 4117.1l(A)(7).
52. Id. § 4117.11(B)(5) and (8).
53. Id. § 4117.11(B)(8).
54. Id. § 4117.14(C).
55. Id. § 4117.14(E).
56. The rules require that the superseding procedural plan be in writing and jointly filed
with SERB within five days of execution. OrIo ADMIN. CODE § 4117-9-03 (1984); see also
id. § 4117-9-07 (collective bargaining agreement must be jointly filed with the Board within
30 days of execution).
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before the effective date of the Act. The reasons are that the parties
may not agree that there is an alternate procedure or, if there is one,
what its terms are. The Act does not set standards. It suggests
some permitted alternative procedures but does not compel them.1
7
There are several questions to be answered, among them: 1) Must
the substitute procedure have terminal points equivalent to those in
the statute?;" 2) If the parties cannot agree that there is an alterna-
tive procedure, how is the issue resolved?; 3) When parties dispute
the terms of the alternative procedure, how is that issue resolved?;
4) If parties reach an impasse in the substitute or superseding proce-
dure without factfinding (both non-safety and safety forces) or arbi-
tration (safety forces), what is the next step?; 5) Must safety
employees go to fact finding and/or arbitration as provided in the
statute?; 6) How is the time to proceed established?; 7) Must non-
safety forces go through statutory factfinding to establish a terminal
point?; 8) How else can a strike notice be crafted to meet the specif-
ies necessary for a legal strike?
It is assumed by SERB, absent notice of a MAD alternative,
that it must inject itself at the statutory time periods. The assump-
tion is a practical necessity. Although the parties are jointly re-
quired to file with the Board those alternative procedures which are
claimed substitutes for the statutory one, they often fail to do so.
Assuming the filing of a MAD which imposes a SERB obligation to
monitor is found to be legal, that will be burden enough. When the
parties fail to file at all, however, it is difficult if not impossible for
the Board to know when its obligations are activated. Thus, logic
and practicality require SERB to assume that a failure to file indi-
cates that the statutory procedure has not been superseded. At the
required time points, the parties are routinely notified by letter
before the forty-fifth day that a mediator is or is not being appointed
to be used at their convenience. As the thirty-first day approaches,
they are asked to attempt factfinder selection before the crucial
date. Formerly, upon failure to select, the parties were reminded
that SERB would deem the failure to be an indication that the par-
ties had a superseding impasse process. Under the present proce-
dure, when the parties fail to make a selection for whatever reason,
the Board makes the selection.59 This enables parties, who are ac-
57. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(1)(a)-(f) (Page Supp. 1984).
58. This question has been partially answered. See In re City of Columbus, 2 OHIo
PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL PREss) 2125 (Ohio SERB Feb. 6, 1985) (holding that a
valid MAD required an element of finality to achieve alternative settlement status).
59. Omo ADMNn. CODE § 4117-9-05(D) (1984).
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tively engaged in bargaining and need more time, to extend the
hearing date by arrangement between themselves and the
factfinder. ° This brings about compliance with the Act, which
does not allow extensions of time before the factfinding
appointment.
The factfinding appointment has a further merit. It flushes out
those parties who have reached a collective bargaining agreement or
have agreed on a MAD but have not notified the Board. Motiva-
tion to report is created because the appointment of the factfinder
starts the fee clock. Of course, the reporting's value is in determin-
ing whether SERB's monitoring duty needs to begin.
D. Waiver Of Statutory Impasse Procedure
If an employee organization wishes to skip the statutory inter-
mediate stages of settlement in order to reach finality more quickly
and be in a position to conciliate (arbitrate) or validly strike, may
the employee organization unilaterally waive the intermediate
steps? Assuming that it is possible to effect a voluntary waiver
under some circumstances, how can it be done? Is a bargained
waiver valid? May there be any MAD scenario for non-safety
forces that eliminates the necessity for a strike notice or denigrates
the specifics in it? May a safety force MAD bypass factfinding or
conciliation in return for a right to strike or some economic quid
pro quo? These are as yet unanswered questions.
E. Consequences For Safety Forces When A Conciliation Order Is
Not Entered During The Current Fiscal Year
Unless the negotiations and the satisfaction of impasse proce-
dures are conducted with sufficient expedition to achieve a concilia-
tion order within the fiscal year during which bargaining began,
safety forces face the prospect of the loss of retroactivity for any
cost items involved in the ultimate settlement.6" Thus, it is essential
to expedite the negotiations through impasse to the point requiring
a conciliation (arbitration) order to safeguard retroactivity, espe-
cially since without conciliation the safety forces are powerless. Ar-
bitration is their only legal recourse. Under the circumstances,
dispatch in reaching the point of ordered conciliation is imperative.
A strike will not rescue retroactivity, and it may result in the severe
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(4)(a) (Page Supp. 1984).
61. Id. § 4117.14(G)(I 1).
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remedy of injunction6 2 coupled with contempt proceedings. The
consequences may be fines and jail. Perhaps of greater concern is
the fact that an unauthorized striker is open to severe personal
sanctions.63
F. Limitations On Legal Job Actions
There is a potential limit on the right to strike by non-safety
forces that goes beyond adequate legal notice. Even when a per-
fectly legal non-safety employee strike takes place, the employer
may successfully petition a common pleas court for a temporary
restraining order by proving that the job action presents a "clear
and present danger" to the public health or safety.' 4 On a finding of
probable cause, the court may enjoin the strike for an interval "not
to exceed" seventy-two hours.
Should a temporary restraining order issue, the public employer
"shall immediately request" SERB to determine whether there is
indeed a clear and present danger within the contemplation of the
statute.65 SERB must act within the period set by the restraining
order. If it finds the requisite danger, the court has jurisdiction to
continue the restraint for a further period, not to exceed sixty days.
The court order must provide that the restraint automatically ex-
pires at the end of sixty days. At this point, the court loses jurisdic-
tion. The order may terminate earlier if the parties achieve a
62. Id. § 4117.15(A).
63. The sanctions on individuals may be imposed in the absence of injunctive action and
are available against both safety and non-safety employees engaged in an illegal strike. Under
the Act:
If the board determines that the strike is not authorized then the public employer:
(1) May remove or suspend those employees who one day after notification by the
public employer of the board decision that a strike is not authorized continue to
engage in the nonauthorized strike; and (2) If the employee is appointed or reap-
pointed, employed, or reemployed, as a public employee, within the same ap-
pointing authority, may impose the following conditions: (a) The employee's
compensation shall in no event exceed that received by him immediately prior to
the time of the violation. (b) The employee's compensation is not increased until
after the expiration of one year from the appointment or reappointment, employ-
ment, or reemployment. (3) Shall deduct from each striking employee's wages, if the
board also determines that the public employer did not provoke the strike, the
equivalent of two days' wages for each day the employee remains on strike com-
mencing one day after receiving the notice called for in division (B)(1) of this sec-
tion. The employer shall give the employee credit for wages not paid after that
point in time due to the employee's absence from his place of employment because
he is on strike.
Id. § 4117.23(B).
64. Id. § 4117.16(A); see also Id. § 4117.14(A),(B)(3), and (D)(2).
65. Id. § 4117.16(A).
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contract.66
The statute imposes a duty on the parties to bargain further for
a period of sixty days from the date of the court order unless agree-
ment is reached in less time.67 The bargaining is done with the
assistance of a mediator appointed by the Board. The mediator, in
his discretion, may require that the bargaining be done either in
public or in private.68 At any time after forty-five days of collective
bargaining without agreement, the mediator may make a public re-
port on the current position of the parties and the efforts which
have been made for settlement. The statute requires that the report
include a statement of the parties' current positions, efforts for set-
tlement, and "offers of settlement. '69 One may presume the legisla-
ture intended that the last offer of each party be included.
An ambiguity is created in subsections 4117.16(A) and (B).
Neither subsection requires that an injunction following a "clear
and present danger" temporary restraint last for a full sixty days.
The third paragraph of subsection (A) caps the period at sixty days
without mandating a restraint of that length.7" It provides for ter-
mination whenever an agreement is reached within whatever time
limit the court places on the order.7'
Subsection (B), however, stipulates that when an injunction fol-
lows the temporary restraining order the parties are to: "engage in
collective bargaining for a period of sixty days from the date of the
order or until agreement is reached, whichever occurs first."72 This
direction, followed explicitly, could result in a full sixty days of bar-
gaining even though a subsection (A) injunction had expired. Thus,
there are conceivable circumstances in which a full sixty days of
bargaining is required by law, despite the earlier expiration of an
injunction prohibiting the strike.
G. Grievance Impasse Alternatives
Section 4117.09(B)(1) requires grievance procedures in all pub-
lic sector contracts. It "may" be topped by final and binding arbi-
66. Id.
67. Id. §4117.16(B).
68. Id. The public or private bargaining alternatives at the mediator's discretion can be
contrasted with § 4117.21, which mandates private bargaining absent agreement to the con-
trary. See In re City of Dayton, No. - (Ohio SERB Apr. 14, 1985) (Board interprets
§ 4117.21 literally and orders private bargaining).
69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.16(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
70. Id. § 4117.16(A).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 4117.16(B).
364 [Vol. 35:353
REPORT FROM SERBLI
tration.73  One may question whether an option was intended.
Given the general policy thrust of the statute against job actions and
lockouts to settle major disputes, surely, the legislature did not in-
tend to authorize strikes over individual grievances involving con-
tract interpretation or alleged violations. However, the permissive
language, read literally, may result in contracts without a final set-
tlement procedure for relatively minor matters. Will failure to set-
tle a grievance set the stage for a legal job action, or must the
grievance remain unresolved if binding arbitration is not part of the
procedure?74
II. IMPROVING BARGAINING IMPASSE PROCEDURES-WHAT
SHOULD BE DONE?
Impasse procedures become a factor only after an exclusive bar-
gaining representative has been selected. In the private sector, it is
assumed that the selection of the representative establishes rela-
tively equal power to consummate a bargain through the leverage of
economic force. In the public sector, impasse activity is coupled
with severe curtailment of the use of economic power. Given that
condition, what should be the role of government in the bargaining
process? 75
One position is that the governmental agency with impasse re-
sponsibility, that is, the duty to get bargaining going again if it
stalls, should be compelled to intervene actively at stated points.
Intervention means to push. The parties must be impelled toward
agreement if possible. Failing agreement, they must be thrust into a
final resolution. In the public sector, finality may be achieved by
arbitration76 or by limited resort to economic pressure.77
A second position may be characterized as "assistance upon re-
quest." This attitude presumes that, as long as the parties are sat-
isfied with their bargaining progress, no one else need be concerned
as long as the functioning of the agency is unimpaired.
73. Id. § 4117.09(B)(1).
74. Subsections 4117.09(B)(2) and (C) are concerned with subjects such as check-offs,
"fair share" fees, rebates, and religious exemptions, which are beyond this Article's scope.
75. The problems inherent in a "neutral" government agency's policing of programs in
which other governmental branches are confrontational participants is passed without
comment.
76. Arbitration is referred to as settlement by a "conciliator" in the Ohio statute. Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(1) (Page Supp. 1984). The statute confines compulsory arbi-
tration to safety force disputes. Id.
77. The right to strike is available only to non-safety forces. Id. § 4117.14(D)(2).
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The compelled intervention mode73 apparently is based on the
unvoiced premise that speedy resolution of bargaining issues has in-
herent value even if neither party has expressed dissatisfaction with
lack of resolution. Under this approach, compelled third-party in-
tervention must occur not only at a recognized impasse, but, im-
passe or not, at statutorily mandated times whether the parties or
either of them acknowledges a block to further bargaining progress.
This means that the possibility that more time might produce vol-
untary agreement is not as important as speed. The monitoring
agency imposes mediation at a specified time; failing agreement dur-
ing mediation, factfinding is compelled, and ultimately a procedure
for final resolution must follow.
The elements of the "assistance upon request" procedure are
quite different. Following notice to negotiate, governmental inter-
vention would be by invitation only. One of the parties would have
to request a mediator. After that, factfinding ensues only if the me-
diator gives notice of impasse or one of the parties requests it. Up
to this point safety and non-safety forces can follow the same im-
passe track.79
The only elements of compulsion remaining in the impasse pro-
cedure under the "assistance" alternative would be arbitration for
safety forces and legal notice before job action by non-safety forces.
To cover unforeseeable contingencies, the Board would retain the
right to intervene whenever it determined an emergency existed to
justify sua sponte interposition.
This simplified procedure has several advantages. First, it mini-
mizes the presence of a third party in the bargaining process and
leaves negotiations to those who know most about them. Second,
78. This is the Ohio schema absent a mutually agreed alternative impasse procedure.
Id. § 4117.14.
A 1980 public sector study recommended "mandatory mediation with the proviso that
state mediation agencies.. . have complete discretion on how much mediation to require, if
any." P. GERHART & J. DROTNING, A SIX STATE STUDY OF IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 105 (1980) (emphasis omitted). The same study concluded, "An optimal
policy would be one in which the agency developed rules requiring agreement by a fixed
timetable... and would appoint a factfinder automatically thereafter on the petition of
either party. The agency should retain special power to authorize delay only in extraordinary
circumstances .... " Id. at 126 (emphasis in original).
79. Factfinding, once begun, could remain subject to the same rules for acceptance as
now prevail in Ohio. This has the merit of preserving a process familiar to the Ohio public
sector and providing a cooling period before imposing compulsory arbitration on safety forces
and before allowing the limited job action permitted other employees. The Ohio Act's cur-
rent sanctions for illegal strike action and provisions for court access would remain
unchanged.
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the artificial time limits imposed on negotiations are removed. If
neither of the parties is sufficiently concerned about the progress of
negotiations to request a mediator, who else should be? Certainly,
there is little or no public interest jeopardized by prolonged bargain-
ing, and surely, one or both of the parties will request assistance if
needed. Third, the impasse system retains the capacity for achiev-
ing an ultimate settlement with minimal third party interference
with bargaining. Fourth, the "assistance upon request" system
eliminates any reason for providing a MAD.O Under the Act as it
stands, (absent implementation by rule) disputes over the question
of a MAD's existence, or the terms of that existence, can be settled
only through an unfair labor practice charge based on a refusal to
bargain. Fifth, and finally, the awesome monitoring duty required
under compelled intervention is limited but not abolished. The re-
sponsibility for the administration of bargaining is reduced
significantly.
The suggested changes applied to section 4117.14 would sub-
stantially reduce, but not eliminate, Board intervention without im-
peding the basic objectives of the statute. This is so because it is
unlikely that many illegitimate refusals to bargain will follow a me-
diator's intervention. If the failure to make progress results from a
genuine impasse, then the mediator's report or the request of either
party will move the events into factflnding. In addition, SERB's
capacity to intervene in critical situations is not restricted.
III. VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION PROCESS
Although the phrase "voluntary recognition" does not appear in
the Act, the concept is clear from the statutory terms. The patent
objective is to establish a quick and easy method for determining
the exclusive collective bargaining representative where there is
either no representation issue or no desire for a contest, or both.81
80. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
81. Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.05 (Page Supp. 1984). This section provides that:
(A) An employee organization becomes the exclusive representative of all the pub-
lic employees in an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining by
... (2) Filing a request with a public employer with a copy to the state employ-
ment relations board for recognition as an exclusive representative. In the request
for recognition, the employee organization shall describe the bargaining unit, shall
allege that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit wish to be represented
by the employee organization, and shall support the request with substantial evi-
dence based on, and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the board demonstrat-
ing that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit wish to be represented by
the employee organization. Immediately upon receipt of a request, the public em-
ployer shall either request an election under division (A)(2) of section 4117.07 of the
Revised Code, or take the following action: (a) Post notice in each facility at which
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At the same time, the design of the statute gives anyone with stand-
ing-that is, an employer, individual worker, or intervening em-
ployee organization-the chance to challenge majority repre-
sentation, to demonstrate a case for intervention, or to question the
appropriateness of the unit, and to have those questions or objec-
tions decided.8"
The recognition process is initiated by an employee organization
filing a request with the public employer, with a copy to SERB, for
recognition as the exclusive representative.8 3 The request must be
supported by substantial evidence that the majority of the employ-
ees in the described bargaining unit wish to be represented by the
employee organization.84 Rules promulgated by the Board pre-
scribe the method for implementing the statutory requirements.8 5
Upon receipt of the request, the employer has five options.
Either it must immediately request an election,86 or it must post a
notice which describes the bargaining unit, gives the name of the
employee organization and the date of the request, and advises em-
ployees that objections must be filed by the twenty-first day follow-
ing the request.87 Upon posting, there is little reason to suppose the
employer is precluded, if timely, from making one of three objec-
tions provided by the statute.8
employees in the proposed unit are employed, setting forth the description of the
bargaining unit, the name of the employee organization requesting recognition, and
the date of the request for recognition, and advising employees that objections to
certification must be filed with the state employment relations board not later than
the twenty-first day following the date of the request for recognition; (b) Immedi-
ately notify the state employment relations board of the request for recognition.
The state employment relations board shall certify the employee organization filing
the request for recognition on the twenty-second day following the filing of the
request for recognition, unless by the twenty-first day following the filing of the
request for recognition it receives: (i) A petition for an election from the public
employer pursuant to division (A)(2) of section 4117.07 of the Revised Code (ii)
Substantial evidence based on, and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the
board demonstrating that a majority of the employees in the described bargaining
unit do not wish to be represented by the employee organization filing the request
for recognition; (iii) Substantial evidence based on, and in accordance with, rules
prescribed by the board from another employee organization demonstrating that at
least ten per cent of the employees in the described bargaining unit wish to be repre-
sented by such other employee organization; or (iv) Substantial evidence based on,
and in accordance with, rules prescribed by the board indicating that the proposed
unit is not an appropriate unit pursuant to section 4117.06 of the Revised Code.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2).
84. Id.
85. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4117-3-01 to -03 (1984).
86. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984) (election to be con-
ducted in accord with § 4117.07(A)(2)).
87. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a).
88. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii)-(iv).
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If there are no objections, the Board will certify the requesting
employee organization as the exclusive bargaining agent for the em-
ployees in the unit described.8 9 This assumes that the described
unit is an appropriate one within the standards established by the
statute and implemented by the Board.90 A unit cannot be made
appropriate simply on request without objection.9 1 When there is
no response to a posted notice before the end of the statutorily man-
dated twenty-one-day period, an otherwise appropriate unit will be
certified. 92
An employer may choose to exercise none of its options. Unless
other parties with standing object, the effect of such inaction is cer-
tification without an election. 93
When a request for recognition is filed, the employer is directed
by the Act to notify the Board. If one of the permissive responses to
the request is made during the twenty-one-day period, the Board is
obligated to follow other processes to resolve the representation
question.94
A somewhat different question arises when a request for recog-
nition is not challenged within twenty-one days and an agreement
granting exclusive recognition is concluded during or after that pe-
riod but before the Board takes any action. The issue is whether the
matter is moot. The Board has determined that the party request-
ing recognition is entitled to a certification even though arguably
the issue has lost its vitality. 95
The statute describes a series of possible challenges to voluntary
recognition which may be made during the period following a re-
89. See id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b).
90. Id. § 4117.06(A) ('The state employment relations board shall decide in each case
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. The determination is final and
conclusive and not appealable to the court.").
91. Id. § 4117.06(C) ('The board may determine a unit to be the appropriate unit in a
particular case, even though some other unit might also be appropriate."). Thus, a unit need
not be the most appropriate one, and the parties may have some leeway in agreeing on a unit.
For example, a unit including supervisors with rank and file employees could be appropriate
where the parties agree. It would not be appropriate, however, if the parties agreed to include
categories that created specifically prohibited combinations, such as combining safety forces
and non-safety forces. See id. § 4117.06(D)(2).
92. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a)-(b).
93. Ravenna Firefighters Ass'n Local 1340 and City of Ravenna 1 OIo Pun. EM-
PLOYEE REP. (LAB. REiL PREss) 1246 (Ohio SERB Nov. 7, 1984).
94. In re Shaker Heights Fraternal Order of Police, No. 23 and City of Shaker Heights 1
Omo Pun. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL. PREss) 1324 (Ohio SERB Nov. 7, 1984) (the
Board vote was 2-1).
95. See OIno REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b) (Page Supp. 1984); Omo ADMIN.
CODE §§ 4117-3-02 to -03 (1984).
19851
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
quest. Any of these actions will block certification at least tempo-
rarily. One frequent challenge is made by an employer filing a
petition for an election.96 This sets in motion procedures to deter-
mine whether an issue of representation exists. Other blocking ac-
tions include claims that (1) a majority of the employees in the unit
do not wish representation by the employee organization that ified
the request, (2) another employee organization has shown that at
least ten percent of the employees in the described unit wish repre-
sentation by it rather than the organization filing the request and (3)
the unit requested is inappropriate.97 The latter three claims all
must be supported by substantial evidence pursuant to rules estab-
lished by the Board.9"
When an employer requests an election, SERB conducts an in-
vestigation in which the single issue is whether there is reasonable
cause to believe a question of representation exists.9 9 The decision
in the Franklin cases determined that simply filing the petition will
satisfy the reasonable cause to believe standard unless it appears
that the petition is frivolous."°
Having determined that reasonable cause to believe that a ques-
tion of representation exists,101 SERB is required to hold a hearing
upon due notice to the parties."°2 The sole issue in that hearing is
whether, in fact, a question of representation exists. 103 The burden
of proof is on the employer because his assertion brings about the
contest and thus imposes the proof obligation. To meet it, the em-
ployer must establish the existence of a representation question by a
preponderance of the evidence."°
A significant remaining issue is what SERB's actions should be
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(i) (Page Supp. 1984).
97. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii)-(iv).
98. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 4117-3-02 to -03 (1984).
99. Section 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(i) incorporates § 4117.07(A) which states that:
When a petition is filed, in accordance with rules prescribed by the state employ-
ment relations board:. .. (2) By the employer alleging that one or more employee
organizations has presented to it a claim to be recognized as the exclusive represen-
tative in an appropriate unit, the board shall investigate the petition, and if it has
reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice to the parties. If the board finds upon the
record of a hearing that a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election
and certify the results ....
100. In re Franklin Local Teachers' Ass'n and Franklin Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
1 OHIO PUB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL. PRESS) 1308 (Ohio SERB Nov. 7, 1984).
101. Frivolity may be exemplified by a failure to allege a cogent reason for believing an
issue of representation exists.
102. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
103. Id.
104. See In re Franklin Local Teachers' Ass'n and Franklin Local School Dist. Bd. of
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if the employer fails to prove that a question of representation ex-
ists. The only logical response to the failure of proof is certification.
This follows because certification without challenge is based on a
comparable but merely assumed conclusion that there is no repre-
sentation issue.1"' When that conclusion has acquired legal cer-
tainty after a hearing and a decision finding no issue, logic requires
that the finding be given the same reward as the assumption.
This position provides the theoretical undergirding for the deci-
sions in the Mad River cases.' 0 6 These cases involved a voluntary
recognition request, which was met by an employer petition for
election. After a hearing, a failure of proof resulted in the dismissal
of the employer petition. Following the dismissal, the certification
requested was granted without an election.' 07
When the hearing results in the conclusion that there is a repre-
sentation issue-that is, the employer proves its contention-the
statute mandates that the Board "direct an election and certify the
results thereof."' 0
IV. SOLVING THE BURDEN OF PROOF PROBLEM UNDER
SECTIONS 4117.05(A)(2) AND 4117.07(A)(2)-WHAT
CAN BE DONE?
The Franklin Local Teachers Association'09 cases followed three
principles that collectively have caused some consternation among
employer groups. These principles are:
Educ., 1 Omo PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. 1308 (Ohio SERB Nov. 7, 1984). See also infra notes
109-15 and accompanying text.
105. If the employee organization's request for recognition meets no objections within 21
days, the Board is required to certify it. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(b) (Page Supp.
1984).
106. In re Mad River Township Professional Fire Fighters' Ass'n IAFF Local No. 2938
and Mad River Township Trustees, 1 Omo PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL. PRESS) 1547
(Ohio SERB Dec. 5, 1984).
107. The issue of failure of proof in In re Franklin Local Teachers' Ass'n and Franklin
Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., I Omo PuB. EMPLOYEE REP. (LAB. REL. PRESS) % 1308
(Ohio SERB Nov. 7, 1984), was raised only after the case reached the Board. The initial
hearing involved some unit questions, but no evidence was introduced to prove the existence
of a majority representation issue. The employer believed that an employer's filing a petition
was sufficient, under existing Board policy, to raise that question. This conclusion repre-
sented the general understanding at the time, and therefore, was warranted. The existing
Board policy justified the assumption that no proof was needed. Thus, it would have been
unfair to decide the case against the employer's position on the representation question sim-
ply because it had not introduced any evidence in support of it. Accordingly, a rehearing was
ordered to give the employer the opportunity to make its factual case and the employee or-
ganization a chance to rebut it.
108. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.07(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984).
109. See supra notes 100 and 104 and accompanying text.
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1) When an employer requests an election "under division
(A)(2) of section 4117.07" in response to a request for voluntary
recognition by an employee organization, °" 0 the employer has
the burden of proving at the statutory representation hearing,11 '
that an issue of representation exists.
2) The quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the employer's bur-
den is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
3) The evidence submitted by the employee organization to sup-
port its request for recognition "with substantial evidence' 112 is
confidential and not available to the employer through compul-
sory process." 1
3
Employers have argued, not without some logic, that these princi-
ples together have imposed a nearly impossible task. The employer
cannot reach the union's evidence to challenge it and is at risk of
committing an unfair labor practice" 4 if it undertakes to question
or canvass its employees respecting their representation preferences.
Thus, it is contended, the showing of interest evidence" 5 must lose
its insulation in order to allow the employer access to material es-
sential to its proof.
On the other hand, it is fundamental that an employee organiza-
tion's documentary evidence to support its representation claim
must be confidential to prevent reprisals against individual employ-
ees because of their support for the union.
To the argument that only a minority of employers would en-
gage in reprisals, labor replies that it does not share that optimism
and that there must be protection against even the possibility of re-
prisal, however unlikely it may be. Any other policy would be so
implicitly intimidating that employees would be afraid to provide
unions with cards, petitions, or any documentary materials demon-
strating their preferences.
There is a solution to which this problem will readily yield. It
will disappear if section 4117.05(A)(2) is amended to eliminate all
reference to a section 4117.07(A)(2) election. This change, with
slight language adjustments in section 4117.05(A)(2), would enable
management to challenge representation in voluntary recognition
cases by simply filing a petition for election. Lacking doubts, the
110. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
111. Id. § 4117.07(A)(2). See also note 104.
112. Id. § 4117.05(A)(2).
113. OHio ADhmN. CODE § 4117-3-03(A) (1984).
114. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1984).
115. That is, "substantial" evidence that a "majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit wish to be represented by the employee organization." Id. § 4117.05(A)(2); see also id.
§ 4117.05(A)(2)(b)(ii).
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employer simply posts as the statute' 16 and rules require and, unless
there are successful objections by others, certification follows. If the
employer has doubts, it has a legitimate interest in knowing whether
its employees wish to be represented by the requesting union. The
union has a corresponding interest in determining whether, in fact,
it has a majority. An early election gives both parties a speedy and
full chance for a test of their respective claims.
The objective of section 4117.05(A)(2) is to facilitate certifica-
tions without an election when there is really no contest between
the parties. If there is a contest, the quick certification possibility is
out. If an employer is better satisfied with a majority established by
a canvass than by a presumption, why not adopt a procedure to
speed up the election process?
The proposals in this Article address some fundamental
problems in the administration of the Ohio Act. There are more.
Consideration of them is deferred to another day.
116. See id. § 4117.05(A)(2)(a).
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